Abstract. This paper contributes to the literature on whether the information disclosure system decreases earnings management. Using China's Multi-Tiered Capital Market including the Main Board, SME Board, and the ChiNext market, we find that earnings management can be effectively reduced by the disclosure system, and that the level of information disclosure is negatively related to earnings management. Comparing firms with a transparency ranking downgrade, we show that firms with a ranking upgrade tend to exhibit a significant decrease in their earnings management activities.
Introduction
What is earnings management? Why do firms manage earnings? What is a tool for earnings management? Jones (2011) [1] suggests that earnings management is to deliver a predetermined profit or achieve a specific objective by using the flexibility within accounting. These definitions suggest that managers usually manipulate earnings to achieve external and internal targets when their pre-managed earnings would be lower than expected earnings. Managers may also influence earnings for their own self-interest to protect their jobs or to increase their compensation. To better protect the interests of investors, stock market authorities around the world are introducing laws and regulations to upgrade firms' corporate governance standards, especially with regard to enhancing information transparency. Likewise, Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) announced the disclosure ranking results for the Main Board market in 2001, for the SME Board market in 2005, and for the ChiNext market in 2010, respectively, to strengthen corporate governance practices and then reduce asymmetric information. Therefore, this paper tends to investigate whether the disclosure system has an influence on the earnings management.
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
The issue this study considers is whether the disclosure system actually reduces earnings management. If the disclosure system can reduce such management by promoting corporate transparency, investors will have greater faith in it, which in turn increases corporate value and improves capital investment efficiency, and this notion is supported by a recent strand of the empirical literature. For instance, consistent with the findings of Verrecchia (1983) [2] , Alsaeed (2006) [3] shows that using information disclosure is an effective way to both improve the corporate governance and reduce agency problems. Although some costs are associated with such practices, investors generally have more confidence in firms with higher transparency. In examining a sample of listed companies in Taiwan, Lai et al. (2012) [4] find that there is a significantly negative association between the level of disclosure and various measures of inefficient investment, indicating that firms with increased disclosure can improve investment efficiency. Jiao (2011) [5] finds significantly positive associations between disclosure rankings and both stock returns and market valuation, and a negative relationship between disclosure quality and myopic managerial behaviors. This study expects that managers reduce the use of earnings management after the implementation of the disclosure system. Therefore, this study proposes the following hypothesis:
H1: The implementation of the disclosure system reduces earnings management.
In an experimental setting, Hunton et al. (2006) [6] find that financial statement formats requiring increased transparency reduced, but did not eliminate managers' attempts to manipulate earnings. Jo and Kim (2007) [7] show that more voluntary disclosure increases transparency, and is associated with a lower likelihood of earnings management. That is to say, increased transparency reduces incentives to manage earnings, because it helps investors to detect earnings management. As discussed above, this study expects that managers of firms with a greater level of information disclosure tend to engage in less earnings management. Consequently, this study proposes the second hypothesis as follows:
H2: A greater level of information disclosure leads to lower earnings management.
Besides viewing the levels of disclosure rankings as better measures for general disclosure quality, some studies employ changes in disclosure rankings as better measures for improvements in disclosure quality (Healy, Hutton, and Palepu, 1999[8] ). This study therefore intends to fill this gap by examining whether firms management activitites correspond to the changes in information disclosure rankings and proposes the following hypothesis H3: Firms that are given an upgraded ranking are likely to use less earnings management than those receiving ranking downgrade.
Methodology Earnings Management
Recent research shows an increased appreciation for understanding and documenting how firms manage earnings through real activities manipulation (RAM).
Following Roychowdhury (2006), we measure real activities manipulation using the following three measures: abnormal levels of operating cash flows, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses. We then compute a single proxy variable, RAM, as the sum of the three variables.
Model specification
To test hypothesis H1 that the implementation of information disclosure leads to lower earnings management, we construct regression model (1) with a dummy variable level year and use three subsample data, the Main Board, SME Board, and the ChiNext market, for estimation, respectively. The regression model (1) is as follows:
(1) ‫ܚ܉܍ܡܔ܍ܞ܍ܔ‬ ‫ܜ‬ = 1 for post-disclosure system, and 0 otherwise；‫ܗܑܜ܉ܚܖܑ܍ܔ܉ܛ‬ ୲ = Shareholders' equitycash and marketable securities + total liabilities at the end of fiscal year t-1, scaled by assets of fiscal year ‫ܗܑܜ܉ܚܘ܍ܔ܉ܛ；1-‪t‬‬ ୲ = Operating cash flow, scaled by assets of fiscal year ‫ۯ۽܀；1-‪t‬‬ ୲ = annual return on assets, scaled by assets of fiscal year ‫܌ܗܚܘ_۱；1-‪t‬‬ ୲ = Sale of fixed assets, scaled by assets of fiscal year t-1
Our second empirical hypothesis is to examine whether the implementation of the information disclosure ranking system (IDRS) rationalize earnings management. To test this hypothesis, we define years before 2001, years before 2005, and years before 2010 as the years before the implementation of the information disclosure system for the Main Board, SME Board, and the ChiNext market, respectively. To test hypothesis H2 that a greater level of information disclosure leads to lower earnings management, we construct regression model (2) with three dummy variables LEVEL4, LEVEL3, and LEVEL2, and use three subsample data, the Main Board, SME Board, and the ChiNext market, for estimation, respectively. The regression model (2) is as follows:
level2 ୲ = 1 if the firm's ranking is C, and 0 otherwise；level3 ୲ = 1 if the firm's ranking is B, and 0 otherwise；level4 ୲ = 1 if the firm's ranking is A, and 0 otherwise； Finally, to examine whether firms with ranking upgrades are likely to experience lower earnings management than those receiving downgrades, we replace the variable IDRS in regression model (3) with two dummy variables, nochange and upgrade, and estimate regression model (3) as follows:
REM ୲ = a ଷ + b ଷ upgrade ୲ + c ଷ nochange ୲ + d ଷ saleinratio ୲ + e ଷ salepratio ୲ + f ଷ ROA ୲ + g ଷ C_prod ୲ + ∑ h ଷ year ୲ + ε ଷ (3) nochange = dummy variable for changes in disclosure rankings, 1 if a firm's ranking remains unchanged, and 0 otherwise; upgrade = dummy variable for changes in disclosure rankings, 1 if a firm was given an upgraded ranking, and 0 otherwise; It is worth noting that in Table 1 , there is a significant positive relationship between our proxy for earnings management and the disclosure system, implying that after the implementation of the system, the increased financial information transparency is more likely to decrease the possibility of misleading investors and then lower earnings management, which corroborate with our hypothesis H1. In addition, the VIFs for these variables are all less than 4, and thus multicollinearity is not an issue when making inferences based on these results.
Empirical Results
In Table 2 , the results show that the relationship between the level of the information transparency and earnings management and reports the empirical results of regression model (2) . As shown in Table 2 , the results indicate that the proxy for earnings management is positively and significantly associated with the level, which implies that the more information a company provides to the public, the lower earnings management becomes, even in the presence of the control variables, consistent with H2. Although the VIF of level4 and level3 are more than 10, it is not a problem because the sum of level4, level3, and level2 equals to one.
In order to test the hypothesis H3 with regard to whether firms with an upgraded ranking are less inclined to manipulate their earnings, this study sorts firms into three groups, namely, upgraded, unchanged, and downgraded, based on the assessments made by the system, and the estimation results are estimated by regression model (3) and presented in Table 3 . The results show that, compared with those with downgraded ranking, firms with an upgraded or/ nochange ranking are less inclined to manipulate their earnings, partially giving support to the hypothesis H3. 
Conclusions
This study examines the relationship between the information transparency and earnings management, hypothesizing that they are negatively related. The empirical results indicate that real activities manipulation can be significantly reduced by the ranking system. Comparing firms with a transparent ranking downgrade, we show that firms with a ranking upgrade or/nochange tend to exhibit a significant decrease in their earnings management activities.
